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ABSTRACT. We analyze the relation between democracy and perceived subjective well-being
while controlling for other relevant determinants such as culture measured by languages. We
conduct a cross-national analysis covering 28 countries using data from the 1998 International
Social Survey Programme. Contrasting existing empirical evidence, we observe a signiﬁcant
positive relationship between democracy and happiness even when controlling for income and
culture measured by language and religion. The eﬀect of democracy on happiness is stronger in
countries with an established democratic tradition.
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1. INTRODUCTION
A more democratic system is likely to produce political outcomes that are
closer to the preferences of the citizens than a system with less democratic
elements.1 Consequently, ceteris paribus, a greater exposure to democracy
can be expected to raise individuals’ well-being. Not only does such expo-
sure lead to political results that are acceptable to a large part of a popu-
lation, but citizens’ well-being may also arise from their participation in the
political decision-making process and from the perceived extent of
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procedural fairness of this process. In fact, such procedural utility might be
even larger than the utility gained from a (democratic) political outcome.2
Therefore, we expect empirical research to show that a higher level of
democratization of a country leads to a higher level of self-reported hap-
piness. However, the limited empirical evidence from international cross-
sectional studies only partly supports this proposition. Based on a sample of
about 40 nations drawn from the World Values Survey, Schyns (1998) and
Veenhoven (2000a) ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant correlation between the
Freedom House Democracy Index and self-reported happiness. However,
this correlation becomes insigniﬁcant once the diﬀerent national income
levels are controlled for.3 In another study based on the World Values
Survey, Inglehart and Klingemann (2000) note that ‘‘[our] ﬁndings under-
mine any simplistic assumption that democratic institutions are the main
determinant of human happiness’’ (p. 180).
The only scholars who ﬁnd a positive and robust inﬂuence of democracy
on subjective life satisfaction are Frey and Stutzer who conducted a series of
analyses focused on the particular case of Switzerland.4 They exploit the fact
that the Swiss federal structure allows for considerable variation in political
institutions across the 26 cantons, especially with regard to direct popular
rights. One drawback of the Swiss case is, however, that the political rights
of Swiss citizens vary only with respect to the cantonal and local levels. At
the federal level, citizens from all cantons have the same political rights with
regard to such important policy ﬁelds as foreign policy, trade, defence, or
the social security system.5 Hence, measured on an international scale, the
extent of democratic rights is very high for all Swiss cantons, but the vari-
ation in the degree of democracy (and in other political institutions) between
cantons is relatively small. An international sample that includes, for
example, established democracies like Great Britain or the United States, as
well as relatively weak democracies such as Russia, will clearly yield a much
higher variation of democracy levels. It is conceivable that this higher var-
iation in democracy levels in an international setting should also have a
more notable impact on self-reported overall happiness.
It can be argued that a cross-national analysis of subjective well-being is
diﬃcult because countries vary not only in terms of democracy, but also
with regard to other determinants that might inﬂuence individual happiness,
such as income and culture. Any cross-national empirical analysis must take
such factors into account. A particularly important determinant is culture:
people in diﬀerent cultures may value certain aspects of life diﬀerently and
could, therefore, have diﬀerent perceptions of their own individual well-
being under the same objective circumstances.6 This possibility is also noted
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by Easterlin (1974, p. 108), and several more recent papers examine this
relationship.7
The case study of Switzerland highlights the importance of such cultural
diﬀerences. The country is divided into three major language regions with
rather diﬀerent cultures, with the borderline being mainly between the
German-speaking region on the one hand and the French- and Italian-
speaking regions on the other hand. In fact, voting patterns in recent public
elections reveal substantial diﬀerences among the diﬀerent language regions
within Switzerland.8 In their happiness analysis, Stutzer and Frey (2003) use
the state language as a proxy for the regionally dominating culture, and the
coeﬃcients of the language variables are typically highly signiﬁcant when
self-reported well-being is regressed on a commonly used set of determinants
of happiness. Moreover, Dorn et al. (2005) ﬁnd that the impact of cantonal
democracy levels on well-being is small and insigniﬁcant once cultural
variables at the individual and state levels are included in the regression
equations. Thus, cultural aspects, which have previously been shown to be a
main source of diﬀerences in the political behavior in diﬀerent countries,
may also play a major role in determining self-reported happiness. Hence,
not only in the Swiss case, but even more in international studies, an analysis
of the eﬀects of democracy on happiness must control for culture.
The use of the main language of a country to reﬂect national culture can
be justiﬁed because, in society, language serves as an important transmission
channel of culture and its embedded view of the world, the social system,
and customs. At the individual level, the mother tongue shapes human
patterns of thought, a view advocated not only by sociobiologists (e.g.,
Allott, 1999) but also by economists (e.g., Lazear, 1999). Consequently, such
cultural variations may not only be reﬂected in institutional diﬀerences but
also in how individuals value the contribution of political institutions to
their individual welfare. Among other factors that are closely related to
culture and that might have an impact on people’s happiness are individuals’
religious denominations, as they reﬂect diﬀering value systems and deter-
mine the goals in life.9
Besides democracy and culture, the economic situation of a country will
also likely aﬀect the well-being of its population. Economists have carefully
studied the impact of income on happiness. As earlier papers by Abramowitz
(1959) and Easterlin (1974) indicate, income growth may have a positive
eﬀect on personal happiness in the short run but not in the long run.10
Consequently, in recent decades, the average level of life satisfaction has
remained constant in many countries despite considerable economic
growth.11 Moreover, Easterlin (1974) shows that countries with rather
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diﬀerent GNP per capita – for example, West Germany and Nigeria, to
mention the two most extreme examples – had nearly the same average
personal happiness rating (p. 106).12 On the other hand, diﬀerences in
economic status within a country have a clear and consistent impact on
personal happiness.13 Thus, to adequately control for the impact of income
on happiness, it is necessary to distinguish between the income level within a
society, and the relative economic position that an individual or family
occupies in this society. In the previous research cited above, based on the
World Values Survey data, GDP per capita had to be used as a crude proxy
for individual income and a distinction between average income level and
relative income position was not feasible.
This paper takes a closer look at the relation between democracy and
perceived subjective well-being, while also taking into account the impact of
culture measured by languages and religion. We conduct a cross-national
analysis covering 28 countries, using data from the 1998 International Social
Survey Programme (ISSP). An important advantage of the ISSP data is that
they allow for the deﬁnition of income variables at the individual level. The
model and methodology of this paper are presented in the next section, and
the following section shows the empirical results. Even after controlling for
culture, income and numerous individual socio-demographic characteristics,
we observe a positive and signiﬁcant relationship between democracy and
happiness. The last section concludes.
2. MODEL AND METHODOLOGY
The eﬀect of democracy on subjective well-being may be identiﬁed in a
cross-national setting in which suﬃcient variation in exposure to democracy
can be observed. Obviously, as discussed above, such a cross-national
analysis requires a rich set of available conditioning variables to control for
the multifaceted happiness-inﬂuencing diﬀerences among individuals and
among countries. An appropriate dataset for this purpose is the 1998 ISSP,
an ongoing program of cross-national collaboration that started in 1985.
The ISSP data are collected by independent institutions in several countries
and topics covered by the data change from year to year. One advantage of
this international micro dataset is, as already mentioned above, that it in-
cludes the interviewee’s household income, which otherwise had to be
substituted with crude income measures at the aggregate level.14
We start with the model developed by Frey and Stutzer (2000) who
analyzed well-being using ordered probit and a rich set of socio-demo-
graphic and socio-economic control variables. These variables include
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gender, age, education, marital status, household type, and employment
status. We deviate from the approach by Frey and Stutzer in two respects.
Following the literature mentioned in the introduction, ﬁrst, we explicitly
take into account the potential impact of culture by including control
variables for the main language of the country and for the religious
denomination of the interviewee. Second, we do not look only at the eﬀect
of (absolute) personal income but rather distinguish between the income
level within a country on the one hand and the relative income position of
the individual on the other.15 We eliminate observations with missing values
in the control variables.
Two measures of individual happiness are often encountered in the lit-
erature. While nearly all authors speak of happiness, only some surveys
truly question respondents about their personal happiness; the others ask
about personal satisfaction or well-being. This ﬁrst holds true for the ISSP
1998, while the second type of question was used, e.g., in the Swiss analyses
by Frey and Stutzer. However, personal satisfaction on the one hand and
happiness on the other may represent quite diﬀerent aspects of personal
life,16 particularly (but not exclusively) for speakers of the German lan-
guage. Nevertheless, the literature usually assumes that these two personal
emotions are comparable insofar as they are both highly correlated with
themselves and with other explanatory variables.17 Therefore, and in
accordance with the usual practice, the two terms are used interchangeably
in this study.
In the 1998 wave of the ISSP, the survey’s ﬁrst question was as follows:
If you were to consider your life in general these days, how happy or unhappy would you say
you are, on the whole?
Respondents could rate themselves as ‘very happy,’ ‘fairly happy,’ ‘not very
happy,’ or ‘not happy at all.’ Table I shows the distribution of these answers
in the 28 countries. In all countries but Latvia, more than half the popu-
lation consider themselves as either ‘very happy’ or ‘fairly happy,’ with
‘fairly happy’ being the most frequent happiness assessment in all but two
countries. Nevertheless, some considerable diﬀerences between countries
can be observed; for example, 44.1% of the Irish consider themselves ‘very
happy,’ whereas this ﬁgure is as low as 4.6% for Latvia and 4.7% for
Hungary and Russia.
To estimate the model, we use an unweighted ordered probit model with
standard errors clustered by countries. The clustering permits that the error
terms of individuals living in the same country can be correlated, while the
assumption of no correlation is only upheld across countries. For the
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institutional variables measured at the country level, such as democracy, the
degree of freedom is then limited by the number of countries in the sample
and not determined by the number of survey respondents (Moulton, 1990).
As a robustness test, we also carry out the identical estimation with addi-
tional macroeconomic determinants included in the model.
To capture the impact of the political system on self-reported happiness,
we use two diﬀerent measures of democracy: the Polity IV index by
Marshall and Jaggers (2003) and the Freedom House index by Karatnycky
(2000). The Polity IV index, which is based on a relatively narrow deﬁnition
TABLE I
Self-reported happiness in 28 countries (in %)
Very
happy
Fairly
happy
Not very
happy
Not at all
happy
Mean
score
Austria 22.6 67.8 8.6 0.9 3.12
Bulgaria 8.7 45.1 28.7 17.4 2.45
Canada 25.4 57.8 14.5 2.2 3.06
Chile 27.5 32.3 34.8 5.4 2.82
Cyprus 21.7 50.6 22.5 5.2 2.89
Czech Republic 8.9 71.3 17.9 1.8 2.87
Denmark 31.8 57.7 8.7 1.8 3.19
France 14.1 65.1 17.8 3.0 2.90
Germany (West) 17.7 66.2 13.5 2.6 2.99
Germany (East) 9.3 61.2 25.3 4.2 2.76
Hungary 4.7 45.1 39.6 10.6 2.44
Ireland 44.1 50.9 4.4 0.6 3.38
Italy 12.4 65.9 18.2 3.5 2.87
Japan 14.3 74.1 10.0 1.6 3.01
Latvia 4.6 43.9 45.0 6.5 2.47
New Zealand 33.0 59.9 6.4 0.6 3.25
Norway 22.1 66.6 10.4 0.9 3.10
Philippines 27.8 53.3 15.0 3.9 3.05
Poland 19.0 63.0 15.3 2.7 2.98
Portugal 19.5 37.5 34.9 8.0 2.69
Russia 4.7 49.4 37.1 8.8 2.50
Slovak Republic 7.1 58.3 26.2 8.4 2.64
Slovenia 9.3 58.6 28.8 3.3 2.74
Spain 19.2 68.1 11.1 1.6 3.05
Sweden 24.4 61.2 12.8 1.6 3.08
Switzerland 28.4 62.1 8.5 0.9 3.18
United Kingdom 35.1 58.1 5.7 1.1 3.24
United States 36.7 52.4 8.9 2.0 3.24
The mean score is obtained by transforming the ordinal scale to a cardinal scale (score 4
for very happy, score 3 for ‘fairly happy’, score 2 for ‘not very happy’, score 1 for ‘not happy at
all’).
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of democracy, assesses the openness of democratic institutions on a scale
from 0 to 10. Components of the index include the extent to which political
executives are chosen through competitive elections and the opportunity of
non-elites to access institutional structures for political expression and to
attain political oﬃce. In contrast, the Freedom House democracy index uses
a broader concept of democracy; it measures a wide array of political rights
and civil liberties on a 7-point scale. These include basic economic and
social freedoms, such as the right to establish a private business or the right
of gender equality. Index values are summarized in Table A.I of the
Appendix.
Based on each of these indices, two variables are deﬁned: one for the
democracy level in 1988, and a second one for the increase in democracy
between 1988 and 1998. This structure takes into account that the ISSP
includes various transitional countries in which democratic structures have
only been established very recently, i.e. between 1988 and 1998.18 It seems
plausible to assume that these new democratic structures would not have the
same impact on happiness as the structures already established a decade or
more ago, i.e. before 1988.
As is common in such studies, language – which can play an important
role at diﬀerent levels, institutional as well as individual – proxies for cul-
ture. To account for culture by language, binary variables are deﬁned for
‘English,’ ‘German,’ ‘North Germanic’ (Scandinavian), ‘Romance,’ ‘Balto-
Slavic, Uralic and Greek,’ and ‘Asian’ (Japanese and Filipino) languages. In
the regressions, ‘English’ is used as the reference group. Controlling for
culture (i.e. language) at the individual level might be important because the
set of factors that contributes to personal satisfaction and the perception of
the beneﬁts of democratic institutions may vary with individual cultural
background. Unfortunately, in the ISSP 1998 survey, information on the
ethnic origin of the respondent is available only for half the countries so that
an individual language measure could not be included.
Another possible variable to represent culture is religion. In some coun-
tries, ethnic groups (or language groups) correspond with diﬀering religious
aﬃliations, whereas in others, such as Switzerland, religion and language are
not highly correlated. The ISSP data allow to control for religious
denominations at the individual level. We use a set of dichotomous variables
indicating whether an individual categorizes herself as ‘Catholic,’ ‘Angli-
can,’ ‘Orthodox,’ ‘other Christian,’ belonging to a ‘non-Christian religion’
or having ‘no religion,’ with ‘Protestant’ forming the reference category.
The equivalence income is computed in U.S. dollars using purchasing
power parity data from Penn World Table 6.1 and the modiﬁed OECD
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equivalence scale.19 Since data on the exact household composition is
unavailable, it is assumed that at least one person in each household is an
adult, while the remaining household members are equally divided into
adults and children. To diﬀerentiate between the income level of a country
and the relative income positions of individuals, we include subsistence in-
come, deﬁned as 40% of the average income in the respective country, and
the diﬀerence between actual individual income and subsistence income.
Moreover, to allow for the likely nonlinearity of the income eﬀect, the base
model includes the squares of these income diﬀerences, calculated separately
for positive and negative diﬀerences. Assuming a positive but decreasing
marginal utility of income, we expect a positive sign for the relative income
variable and a negative one for its squared term. If only relative income
matters, the coeﬃcient of subsistence income should be zero. If only abso-
lute income matters, the coeﬃcients of subsistence and relative income
should be both positive and identical.
3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Following the Hendry approach, we start with the comprehensive model
estimated separately for both democracy indices. The results are given in
Table A.II of the Appendix. In both cases, the squared income variable for
those below the poverty line does not prove signiﬁcant. Therefore, this
variable is excluded for further analysis. The subsequent discussion of the
results is restricted to the reduced model of the ISSP dataset.
The results for the democracy, income and language variables are given in
Table II. Established democratic structures as represented by the Polity IV
democracy index for the year 1988 have a positive impact on happiness
which is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Given that only 28 countries
pertain to the sample, which causes the degrees of freedom for variables
measured at the country level to be small, we consider this signiﬁcance level
to be quite high. The eﬀect of democracy can be observed even though many
relevant sociodemographic and economic factors, including individual
household income, have been controlled for. This ﬁnding is robust with
respect to the inclusion of language and religious denomination variables. If
the Freedom House democracy index is used in place of the Polity IV
measure, the coeﬃcient of the democracy 1988 variable is even larger,
although its statistical signiﬁcance level is slightly lower. The marginal eﬀect
of democracy on happiness is sizable: one additional point on the Freedom
House scale increases the probability that a subsistence income earner is
‘very happy’ by as much as an increase of the equivalence income by 7,000
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U.S. dollars per year.20 These results strongly support the hypothesis that a
higher degree of democracy in a country increases citizens’ happiness.
Democratic structures that were newly acquired between 1988 and 1998
have a positive, but in most speciﬁcations insigniﬁcant impact on happiness.
The Wald tests show that in three of the four estimations, the newly
established democratic structures have a signiﬁcantly weaker positive eﬀect
on happiness than the older democratic institutions that were already in
place in 1988.21 Between 1988 and 1998, several countries in the sample –
predominantly in Eastern Europe – went through a transition from
authoritarian regimes to democratic systems. These estimation results are
consistent with the notion that residents of these countries do not (yet)
beneﬁt as much from democracy as do residents of countries with longer
democratic traditions. The reason may be that democratic institutions have
not been in place long enough to permit substantial change toward more
broadly accepted policies. Moreover, it has been observed in transitioning
countries that the introduction of democracy may create overly optimistic
expectations with regard to the future that later may not be fulﬁlled, thus
resulting in decreasing happiness during at least a part of the transition
process.22
Culture, as measured by the language variables, has a very strong impact
on subjective well-being. Ceteris paribus, residents of predominantly Eng-
lish-speaking countries report higher levels of life satisfaction than residents
from countries with other cultures.23 Conversely, levels of self-reported
happiness tend to be lowest in countries outside the Germanic language
tradition, i.e. where neither English, German, nor North-Germanic (Scan-
dinavian) languages are spoken. In countries with a Balto-Slavic, Uralic, or
Greek language, the predicted probability that a survey respondent be ‘very
happy’ is ceteris paribus more than 16 percentage points lower than in a
country where English is spoken.24 These results support our hypothesis
that culture plays an important role in determining well-being. While we do
not claim to having identiﬁed the cause of culture’s impact, several expla-
nations seem consistent with these ﬁndings. First, in some cultures, there
may be a social expectation that individuals should answer questions about
their well-being by saying that they were ‘happy’ or ‘very happy,’ while such
a positive assessment is not necessarily a social norm in other cultures.
Moreover, it is possible that the pursuit of happiness might not be of equal
importance as a goal of life in every culture.25 Finally, given that the term
‘happiness’ might not have the exactly identical meaning across languages,
such language diﬀerences might contribute to diﬀerences in the levels of self-
reported well-being.
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With respect to religious denominations, which arguably also capture
cultural identity, the results show on the one hand that there are no sig-
niﬁcant diﬀerences between various Christian denominations. On the other
hand, individuals with a ‘non-Christian religion’ and with ‘no religious
denomination’ report signiﬁcantly lower happiness levels than the reference
group.26 The distinction between national income level and relative income
position of individuals proves to be relevant. Relative income is always
highly signiﬁcant, while subsistence income is usually insigniﬁcant. This
ﬁnding provides evidence in favor of the relative income hypothesis.
Moreover, the squared income above the poverty line is always highly
signiﬁcantly negative, indicating decreasing marginal utility of income.
We tested the robustness of democracy’s eﬀect on well-being using the
baseline model (as reported in columns two and four of Table II) by con-
trolling for several variables that capture important aspects of the general
economic conditions of a country; namely growth of real GDP per capita,
unemployment, and consumer price inﬂation.27 The results of the robustness
tests are reported in Table III. The additional macro-level variables which
were added one by one or jointly to the baseline model all have clearly insig-
niﬁcant coeﬃcients. The democracy variables remain signiﬁcant when con-
trolling for the unemployment rate. The inclusion of inﬂation orGDP growth,
however, strongly inﬂates standard errors such that the democracy variables
are no longer signiﬁcant.28 Nonetheless, throughout all the additional speci-
ﬁcations, the coeﬃcients of the democracy variables remain roughly at the
level of the baseline model. Furthermore, given the insigniﬁcance of the
control variables, a general-to-speciﬁc analysis would again lead back to the
baseline model presented in Table II and in the ﬁrst column of Table III.
In conclusion, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant impact of the degree of democrati-
zation on people’s self-reported happiness, even if we control for culture as
represented by national language and individual religion. Furthermore, the
robustness tests suggest that macro-economic conditions only partly serve as
channels of transmission but that a direct institutional linkage persists be-
yond.29 With this ﬁnding, we contradict extant empirical analyses using
cross-national individual data which found the inﬂuence of national income
to be dominating over political institutions (e.g. Schyns, 1998; Veenhoven,
2000a). In light of this previous research, our results also reveal the
importance of data quality and the insubstitutability of missing individual
income data with aggregate GDP per capita. In addition, we contrast the
recent ﬁndings for Switzerland in Dorn et al. (2005) which revealed no
association of participatory rights with self-reported well-being once cul-
tural inﬂuences were taken into account.
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TABLE III
Robustness tests
1998 ISSP Data, Cross Section, 25,937 Observations, Ordered Probit
Models with the Polity IV
Index
Democracy in 1988 0.068**
(2.14)
0.076***
(3.12)
0.079
(1.24)
0.052
(1.10)
0.083
(1.30)
Change in Democracy
88–98
0.051**
(2.06)
0.060**
(2.47)
0.062
(1.00)
0.037
(0.81)
0.070
(1.09)
Unemployment rate 0.009
(0.72)
0.009
(0.85)
Inﬂation 0.003
(0.26)
0.011
(0.65)
Growth rate of real
GDP p.c.
0.014
(0.58)
0.026
(0.78)
Wald Tests
Joint signiﬁcance
of democracy variables
6.74** 10.08*** 3.06 2.31 2.70
Joint signiﬁcance
of control variables
1.22
Models with the Freedom
House index
Democracy in 1988 0.110*
(1.87)
0.130**
(2.08)
0.111
(0.78)
0.076
(0.84)
0.145
(1.05)
Change in Democracy
88–98
0.066
(1.09)
0.083
(1.33)
0.067
(0.47)
0.036
(0.38)
0.113
(0.76)
Unemployment rate 0.009
(0.69)
0.011
(0.83)
Inﬂation 0.001
(0.06)
0.010
(0.47)
Growth rate of real
GDP p.c.
0.015
(0.62)
0.024
(0.69)
Wald Tests
Joint signiﬁcance
of democracy variables
6.58** 6.90** 5.18* 4.65* 4.57
Joint signiﬁcance
of control variables
0.96
Absolute values of z-statistics in parentheses, ‘***’, ‘**’, and ‘*’ indicate that the estimated
paramater is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 1, 5, or 10% level, respectively. The Wald
tests are v2 with 2 and 3 degrees of freedom.
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4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we analyze the impact of democracy on subjective well-being in
an international comparison of 28 countries. We control not only for a
multitude of sociodemographic and economic determinants of life satisfac-
tion, but also for cultural inﬂuences as captured by language and religion
variables.
Contrasting earlier empirical evidence (e.g. Schyns, 1998; Veenhoven,
2000a), our analysis is the ﬁrst study that reports a signiﬁcant inﬂuence of
democracy on individuals’ subjective well-being in an international context.
The result is robust to the inclusion of culture and income variables. Fur-
thermore, the eﬀect of democracy remained positive when macro-economic
variables were added to the model. These ﬁndings provide empirical support
for theoretical work in the ﬁeld of political economy which suggests that
higher levels of democracywill, ceteris paribus, lead to procedures and policies
that correspondmore closely to voters’ preferences and thus increase people’s
happiness.
In our investigation, culture as measured by language has a considerable
impact on subjective well-being while religious denomination is less decisive.
The impact of language is also more robust than the eﬀect of political
institutions. With regard to national culture, it appears that the happiest
people live in English-speaking nations, followed by individuals in German-
speaking and Scandinavian nations.
Finally, we conﬁrm previous research by showing that relative income has
a positive impact on happiness, but with diminishing returns. This result is
consistent with the usual assumption of decreasing marginal utility. Whether
the absolute income of a person also has an impact on happiness is not
unambiguously determined by this study. However, even if absolute income
has an additional impact on happiness, the eﬀect of relative income clearly
dominates.
The question of whether or not democracy increases happiness is especially
timely in view of the transitioning of many countries from authoritarian to
democratic structures within the past 20 years. Our results show that, com-
pared to countries with a longer democratic tradition, the positive eﬀect of
democracy on life satisfaction is smaller in these transitioning countries. Thus,
after the introduction of democratic structures, it may take some time before
the full beneﬁts of democracy in the form of higher individual life satisfaction
can be reaped.
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NOTES
1 See, e.g., Pommerehne (1978) or, for theoretical models, Besley and Coate (2001) or Feld and
Kirchga¨ssner (2001).
2 See Stutzer and Frey (2003) and Frey and Stutzer (2005).
3 See also Bjørnskov (2003) for a similar result.
4 See, e.g., Frey and Stutzer (2000, 2002), as well as Stutzer and Frey (2003). In an interna-
tional context, Jungeilges and Kirchga¨ssner (2002) found a negative relation between the extent
of civil liberties and suicide rates.
5 Among the important ﬁelds of politics at the cantonal level are education, welfare, and
police.
6 For this, see, e.g., Lijphart (1979), or the diﬀerence between Europeans and Americans with
respect to (economic) inequality shown in Alesina et al. (2004).
7 See, e.g., the contributions in Diener and Suh (2000). For the eﬀect of culture on economic
outcomes see, e.g., Guiso et al. (2006).
8 See also Lijphart (1979), who concluded that ‘‘because language is a crucial diﬀerentiator
among nations, it is bound to be a major cleavage and a main source of partisan diﬀerences in
‘nations’ that are not linguistically homogeneous’’ (p .453).
9 See, e.g., Ferriss (2002) or Bjørnskov (2003).
10 As soon as individuals adjust to their new situation, the level of happiness may settle down to
the old equilibrium. See, e.g., Easterlin (2001, 2003).
11 Several studies provide evidence for this observation. See, e.g., the papers cited in Frey and
Stutzer (2002, p. 413), and also Frank (1997), Oswald (1997), McBride (2001), and Easterlin
(2003). The long-term impact may even go in the reverse direction, from happiness to economic
growth. See for this Kenny (1999).
12 See also the graph in Frey and Stutzer (2002, p. 417), which suggests that above a level of
about 5,000 US dollars per capita (in 1995 PPP) there exists no obvious relation between GNP
per capita and personal happiness (see also Bjørnskov et al., 2005). That absolute income might,
nevertheless, also have an impact on happiness is shown, e.g., by Schyns (2002).
13 For the impact of relative income on happiness see, e.g., D’Ambrosio and Frick (2004),
Luttmer (2004) as well as DiTella andMacCulloch (2005). Another question is whether it is really
income and not wealth together with income that matters. For this, see Headey and Wooden
(2004) or Headey et al. (2004).
14 In contrast, the World Value Survey data contain household income information in form of
income brackets.
15 The variables used in the model are listed in Table A.III of the Appendix. Minor diﬀerences
in the model speciﬁcation are caused by the availability of explanatory variables.
16 For the diﬀerence between satisfaction and happiness see, e.g., Lane (1991, chapter 22) or
Veenhoven (2000b).
17 See, e.g. Veenhoven (2000a).
18 It should be noted that the sample includes no country in which the Polity IV democracy
level decreased between 1988 and 1998. In the same period, the Freedom House democracy
score slightly declined in three countries of the sample. The variable ‘Increase in Freedom
House Democracy Score 1988–1998’ assumes a negative value for these countries.
19 See Heston et al. (2002) and Van Doorslaer and Masseria (2004, p. 12).
20 In the model that includes controls for languages and religion, the marginal eﬀects for being
‘very happy’ are 0.0279 for the Freedom House democracy level 1988, 0.0040 for relative
income measured in $K, and minus 0.0017 for (relative income/10) squared. One additional
point on the Polity index scale has the same eﬀect as an additional income of $4,500. The full list
of marginal eﬀects can be obtained from the authors.
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21 Note that in every model of Table I additional Wald tests consistently reject the null
hypothesis that the coeﬃcients of the two democracy variables are jointly equal to zero at least
at the 10% level.
22 See Moller and Dickow (2002) for South Africa, or Veenhoven (2001) for Russia. Note that
the cross-section data of the ISSP does not allow to speciﬁcally model such transition processes.
23 One reader of this paper suggested that English-speaking countries are more aﬀected
by migration than others, which would cause an upward bias to well-being if migrants were
particularly happy. However, when we analyze a country-speciﬁc variable for ethnic origin in the
subsample of residents of theUnitedKingdom,we ﬁnd no evidence that would support this claim.
24 The marginal eﬀects of the language variables on the probability of being ‘very happy’ are (in
comparison to English) )0.064 for German, )0.066 for North-Germanic languages, )0.143 for
Romance languages, )0.166 for Balto-Slavic, Uralic, and Greek languages, and )0.090 for
Asian languages. The reported values refer to the model that uses the Polity IV democracy
index; however, almost identical marginal eﬀects are obtained with the Freedom House index.
25 For this, see, e.g., Ahuvia (2002).
26 See the results in Table A.II of the Appendix. Similarly, Ferriss (2002) ﬁnds for the US that
diﬀerences in happiness between themain denominations of Judeo-Christianismappear negligible.
27 Deﬁnitions and sources of these variables are given in Table A.III of the Appendix. Note
that the income level of a country is already controlled for by the substitution income variable,
which is here deﬁned as 40% of a country’s average income level.
28 In the models using the Freedom House index, Wald tests always reject the null hypothesis
that both democracy variables have zero impact on happiness at least close to the 10% level.
With the Polity index, the results are somewhat weaker.
29 In the Swiss context, for the impact of democracy on economic performance see Feld and
Savioz (1997), or in a cross-national context, Barro (1996) and Perotti (1996). On inﬂation, see
Desai et al. (2003).
APPENDIX
TABLE A.I
Democracy index levels in 28 countries
Polity IV index Freedom House index
1988 Change
1988–1998
1988 Change
1988–1998
Austria 10.0 0.0 7.0 0.0
Bulgaria 0.0 8.0 1.0 4.5
Canada 10.0 0.0 7.0 0.0
Chile 2.0 6.0 3.5 2.0
Cyprus 10.0 0.0 6.5 0.5
Czech Republic 0.0 10.0 1.5 5.0
Denmark 10.0 0.0 7.0 0.0
France 9.0 0.0 6.5 0.0
Germany (West) 10.0 0.0 6.5 0.0
Germany (East) 0.0 10.0 1.5 5.0
Hungary 2.0 8.0 3.5 3.0
IMPACT OF DEMOCRACY AND CULTURE ON HAPPINESS 519
TABLE A.I
Continued
Polity IV index Freedom House index
1988 Change
1988–1998
1988 Change
1988–1998
Ireland 10.0 0.0 7.0 0.0
Italy 10.0 0.0 7.0 )0.5
Japan 10.0 0.0 7.0 )0.5
Latvia 0.0 8.0 2.5 4.0
New Zealand 10.0 0.0 7.0 0.0
Norway 10.0 0.0 7.0 0.0
Philippines 8.0 0.0 5.5 0.0
Poland 0.0 9.0 3.0 3.5
Portugal 10.0 0.0 6.5 0.5
Russia 0.0 4.0 2.5 1.5
Slovak Republic 0.0 9.0 1.5 4.5
Slovenia 1.0 9.0 3.0 3.5
Spain 10.0 0.0 6.5 0.0
Sweden 10.0 0.0 7.0 0.0
Switzerland 10.0 0.0 7.0 0.0
United Kingdom 10.0 0.0 7.0 )0.5
United States 10.0 0.0 7.0 0.0
The Polity IV democracy index is measured on a 10-point scale and the Freedom House index is
measured on a 7-point scale. In the case of both indices, higher scores represent higher levels of
democracy.
TABLE A.II
Results comprehensive model
Model with the
Polity IV index
Model with the
Freedom House index
Democracy in 1988 0.068** (2.54) 0.110* (1.87)
Change in democracy
from 1988 to 1998
0.051** (2.06) 0.066 (1.09)
Age <30 Reference category
Age 30–39 )0.096** (2.46) )0.096** (2.43)
Age 40–49 )0.216*** (5.30) )0.214*** (5.29)
Age 50–59 )0.233*** (4.58) )0.232*** (4.51)
Age 60–69 )0.131** (2.15) )0.127** (1.40)
Age 70–79 )0.087 (1.43) )0.085 (1.40)
Age 80 and older 0.099 (1.35) 0.103 (1.39)
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TABLE A.II
Continued
Model with the
Polity IV index
Model with the
Freedom House index
Male Reference category
Female 0.018 (1.00) 0.018 (0.99)
Low education Reference category
Middle education 0.106*** (3.60) 0.094*** (2.80)
High education 0.147*** (4.20) 0.134*** (3.48)
Single 0.038 (1.03) 0.054 (1.41)
Married / living together Reference category
Divorced or separated )0.334*** (9.76) )0.338*** (10.22)
Widowed )0.318*** (7.87) )0.321*** (7.74)
Household with one person )0.277*** (5.45) )0.289*** (5.80)
Household with two persons Reference category
Household with more
than two persons
0.142*** (6.16) 0.142*** (6.06)
Employed Reference category
Self-employed 0.063** (2.34) 0.061** (2.24)
Unemployed )0.351*** (6.47) )0.342*** (6.27)
Housewife / houseman 0.087*** (2.62) 0.086** (2.58)
Other employment status 0.034 (1.12) -0.032 (1.12)
Subsistence income )0.003 (0.15) )0.005 (0.27)
Relative income 0.016*** (7.09) 0.016*** (6.98)
(Income above poverty line/10) squared )0.007*** (3.46) )0.067*** (3.43)
(Income below poverty line/10) squared 0.116 (0.84) 0.111 (0.77)
English Reference category
German )0.250*** (2.66) )0.222*** (2.58)
North-Germanic languages )0.258*** (2.67) )0.261*** (2.73)
Romance languages )0.564*** (4.56) )0.556*** (4.54)
Balto-Slavic and Uralic languages, Greek )0.653*** (4.71) )0.633*** (4.35)
Asian languages )0.353*** (3.63) )0.336*** (3.59)
Protestant Reference category
Catholic )0.004 (0.06) )0.003 (0.05)
Anglican )0.001 (0.01) 0.008 (0.08)
Orthodox )0.120 (1.10) )0.130 (1.16)
Other Christian church )0.122 (1.27) )0.131 (1.30)
Non-Christian religion )0.182*** (2.68) )0.176*** (2.70)
No religion )0.199*** (3.94) )0.193*** (3.84)
Number of observations 25,937 25,937
Log of pseudo-likelihood )26,063.01 )26,064.48
Adjusted McFadden’s R2 0.079 0.079
The numbers in parentheses are the absolute values of the z-statistics of the estimated
parameters. ‘***’, ‘**’, ‘*’ show that the estimated parameter is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero
at the 1, 5, or 10% level, respectively.
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TABLE A.III
Deﬁnition of variables
Variable Deﬁnition
Happiness Four categories
Age 30–39 1 if age is between 30 and 39, 0 otherwise
Age 40–49 1 if age is between 40 and 49, 0 otherwise
Age 50–59 1 if age is between 50 and 59, 0 otherwise
Age 60–69 1 if age is between 60 and 69, 0 otherwise
Age 70–79 1 if age is between 70 and 79, 0 otherwise
Age 80 and older 1 if age is older than 80, 0 otherwise
Female 1 if person is female, 0 otherwise
Intermediate education 1 if person has incomplete or completed
secondary II education, 0 otherwise
High education 1 if person has incomplete or completed
tertiary education, 0 otherwise
Single 1 if marital status is single, 0 otherwise
Widowed 1 if marital status is widowed, 0 otherwise
Divorced or separated 1 if marital status is divorced or separated,
0 otherwise
Household size one person 1 if person is living in a one-person household,
0 otherwise
Household size three or
more persons
1 if person is living in a household with three or
more persons, 0 otherwise
Self-employed 1 if a person is self-employed or employed
in her own company, 0 otherwise
Housewife 1 if person is a housewife or a houseman, 0 otherwise
Other employment status 1 if person works in a family business,
is an apprentice or a student, does military service,
is retired or has a not classiﬁed status
Unemployed 1 if person is unemployed and either
oﬃcially recorded or not, 0 otherwise
Subsistence income 40% of the national average equivalence income,
measured in units of 1000 Dollars per year
(PPP adjusted). Source: Heston et al. (2002).
Relative income Individual deviance from national subsistence
income, measured in units of 1000 Dollars per year
(PPP adjusted)
(Income above poverty
line/10) squared
Relative income divided by 10, squared
(if relative income has a positive value)
(Income below poverty
line/10) squared
Relative income divided by 10, squared
(if relative income has a negative value)
German 1 if main language of country is German, 0 otherwise
North-Germanic languages 1 if main language of country is a North-Germanic
(Scandinavian) language, 0 otherwise
Romance languages 1 if main language of country is a
Romance language, 0 otherwise
Balto-Slavic, Uralic,
Greek languages
1 if main language of country is Balto-Slavic,
Uralic or Greek language, 0 otherwise
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